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Parliamentary Control, Public Discussions and
Royal Autonomy: Sweden, 1750-1780
PatrikWINTON*
Abstract. This article explores developments of secrecy and transparency in relation to
ýscal affairs in 18th century Sweden. During the 1750s the government mostly relied
on subsidies and loans from the Bank of Sweden to ýnance deýcits and major projects.
This system supported the ruling oligarchy and the secrecy that surrounded its ýnancial
operations. The system was changed following the Seven Years’ War when the subsidies
stopped arriving and the falling value of the Swedish currency forced limitations on the
issuance of bank liquidity. Instead external borrowing, in Amsterdam and Genoa, and
internal borrowing expanded. This change went hand in hand with increasing openness
concerning ýscal affairs and more critical public discussions about the use of resources.
However, the inability to ýnd compromises led to the royal coup in 1772, which in turn
resulted in a strengthening of royal power and a stop to open discussions about key
ýscal affairs. The period ended with a return to greater economic stability, but it also
entailed a return to the secrecy of the 1740s and 1750s.
Keywords. Subsidies, External Borrowing, Banking, Secrecy, Openness
Résumé. Contrôle parlementaire, débat public et autonomie royale en Suède,
1750-1780. Cet article examine la problématique du secret et de la transparence en
lien avec les questions ýnancières en Suède au XVIIIe siècle. Pendant les années 1750,
le gouvernement comptait principalement sur les subsides étrangers et les prêts de la
Banque de Suède pour se ýnancer. Ce système, reposant sur le pouvoir de l’oligarchie
en place et le secret des opérations ýnancières, a été modiýé suite à la guerre de
Sept Ans, les subsides n’étant plus payés et la chute du cours de la monnaie suédoise
nécessitant de limiter l’émission de liquidités bancaires. La Suède se tourne alors vers
l’emprunt. Ce changement est allé de pair avec une multiplication des débats publics
critiques concernant les déýcits et les ressources économiques. L’incapacité de trouver
des compromis a conduit au coup d’État de 1772, qui a abouti à un renforcement de
l’autorité royale et a marqué un coup d’arrêt des discussions. Il en est résulté une plus
grande stabilité économique, ainsi qu’un retour au secret caractéristique des deux
décennies 1740 et 1750.
Mots-clés. Subsides, emprunts extérieurs, banque, secret, ouverture
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In 1766, the Swedish Diet, which consisted of the four estates of
the nobility, clergy, burghers and peasants, and which controlled the
government’s ýnances and legislation, decided to implement a Freedom
of the Press Act. The act abolished pre-publication control of secular
publications, as well as introduced the principle of open access to
government documents. The principle of open access meant that most
documents from the Diet, the Council of the Realm, the civil service and
the law courts became accessible to citizens who wished to publish them in
print.1 This decision has been seen as an international landmark and as a
sign of especially “the Scandinavian tradition of press freedom and freedom
of information”. According to Christopher Hood, the Swedish policy can be
placed between two major strains of European political ideas, namely the
concept that governments should follow ýxed and predictable rules, and
the notion that social affairs “should be conducted with a high degree of
frankness, openness, and candour”.2
At the same time as transparency in political life increased, the Swedish
state changed its methods of ýnancing its deýcits. During the 1740s and
1750s it had to a large extent relied on subsidies from the French government
and loans from the Bank of Sweden to cover discrepancies between revenues
and expenditure. These practices were shaped by the secrecy of diplomatic
negotiations and a mercantilist fear of providing valuable information to
other states. Following the French ýscal problems at the end of the Seven
Years’ War, which made it difýcult for the government in Versailles to pay
subsidies, and the realization among the political elite in Sweden that the
Bank of Sweden’s issuance of paper money had to be curtailed, new ways
of ýnancing the deýcit had to be found. Attempts were therefore made to
issue long-term bonds on the domestic credit market, as well as establishing
Sweden as a reliable debtor on international capital markets in Amsterdam
and Genoa. Concurrently, a public debate on the state of ýscal affairs and
the possible solutions to the existing problems were raging in newspapers
and pamphlets.3
However, these measures did not create stability or solve the underlying
political and economic problems. Consequently, it created an opportunity for
the king to organize a coup d’état in 1772, which signiýcantly strengthened
the powers of the king and reduced the freedom to print. A more divided
1. M.-C. SKUNCKE, 2011.
2. C. HOOD, 2006, p. 5-8.
3. J. RILEY, 1980, p. 144-147; P.WINTON, 2012a.
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ýscal authority emerged, which led to struggles between the political elite
and the king regarding the ýnancial affairs of the state and the mechanisms
of ýnancial control. The king tried to strengthen and protect his political
autonomy, while the elite tried to reduce the king’s maneuverability.4
These Swedish developments from around 1750 to 1780 provide an
opportunity to explore the mechanisms behind the emergence of ýnancial
control and transparency in relation to government ýnances. Thus, it is the
purpose of this article to analyze how the political process of managing the
ýnances of the state, especially the state’s deýcits and debts, affected the
establishment of increased transparency in Sweden, but also to investigate
how information about ýscal affairs were collected, interpreted and
distributed within the political system.
The Swedish case is particularly interesting since it can problematize
the process of transition from more secretive ýnancial regimes to more
liberal constitutional ones, in particular since most of the narratives of this
process are based on developments in major European states such as Britain
and France. The transition does not necessarily have to be a linear process
– parliamentary control and ýnancial openness can be revoked and there is
no guarantee that a sovereign will not try to regain his autonomy in ýnancial
matters. Thus, the often-discussed and inþuential argument put forward by
Douglass North and Barry Weingast concerning the process of parliament
gaining authority over ýscal affairs and the subsequent establishment of
credible commitment to established rules cannot be taken as a blueprint for
overall European developments.5 Furthermore, the argument put forward by
Philip Hoffman and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal concerning the role of warfare
in creating incentives for rulers to increase openness in ýscal affairs can be
evaluated by examining the Swedish case. They argue that the increasingly
expensive wars during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries led to a
situation in which it became advantageous for leaders to increase openness
and to reduce their own control over government spending in order to gain
access to more funds. Consequently, sovereigns started to surrender the
power of the purse to the elite.6
4. P.WINTON, 2012b.
5. D. C. NORTH& B. R.WEINGAST, 1989. See also D. STASAVAGE, 2003; G. W. COX, 2011;
D. ACEMOGLU & J. A. ROBINSON, 2012.
6. P. T. HOFFMAN, & J.-L. ROSENTHAL, 2000. Mark Dincecco has argued that regular
parliamentary control over state budgets emerged during the nineteenth century, but he
emphasizes that þscal centralization occurred before the establishment of parliamentary
control, see M. DINCECCO, 2011, p. 27.
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In Swedish historiography, many have discussed the introduction of
the Freedom of the Press Act in 1766 and the subsequent growing number of
publications. It has been seen as a gradual process in which amore favorable
opinion among the elite concerning print in the 1750s and 1760s led to a
more liberal approach to pre-publication censorship and then eventually to
the abolishment of censoring texts before publication. Many scholars have
also highlighted the role of actors such as Anders Chydenius and Peter
Forsskåhl, and their struggle to promote greater freedom to print. Clearly,
print was becoming an increasingly important political tool that could be
used by the elite to mobilize political support, but also by people outside
the elite who challenged the status quo. The growing number of newspapers
and pamphlets helped to create a public sphere where a variety of ideas and
opinions were exchanged by individuals from different social and economic
backgrounds.7
However, scholars have seldom discussed the connections between
ýnancial matters and the change in attitude toward print. Nor have they
addressed the role government ýnances played in shaping the greater
political changes in the 1760s and 1770s. Financial historians have
concentrated on the poor state of the government ýnances after the Seven
Years’ War and the varying attempts to deal with inþation and deþation as
well as the government’s debt. In their narrative, the ýnancial crisis of the
1760s was solved by the currency reform in 1776 when the silver standard
was readopted.8 Political historians on the other hand have focused more on
the radicalization of the 1760s and the causes behind the royal coup d’état in
1772. This shift has been seen as a result of the increasing political tensions
between the estates and especially the commoners’ attacks on the privileges
of the nobility. These tensions made it difýcult to reach any compromises
between the various interests at the Diet, which in turn resulted in a longing
for the authority of the king to settle some of the disputes. In other words,
many actors welcomed the king’s actions since they hoped that he would
promote concord and protect the elite.9
7. See for example, A. BURIUS, 1984; P. VIRRANKOSKI, 1995; M. MELKERSSON, 1997,
p. 118-135; B. BENNICH-BJÖRKMAN, 2003; P. HALLBERG, 2003.
8. See for example K. ÅMARK, 1961; S. FRITZ, 1967; L. HERLITZ, 2003.
9. See for example H. A. BARTON, 1986; M. ROBERTS, 1986; J. NORDIN, 2003;
H. TANDEFELT, 2008; P. IHALAINEN, 2010, p. 157-243.
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1. Subsidies, loans and secrecy
The Swedish realm (comprising Sweden, Finland and western
Pomerania) around 1750was one of a few countries in the eighteenth century
with a type of parliamentary system. Royal absolutism had been crushed
in 1719 after the death of the king Charles XII and after participating for
over 18 years in the drawn out Great Northern War (1700-1721). The new
constitution guaranteed frequentmeetings of theDiet,which decidedmatters
of peace and war, foreign policy, taxes and legislation. The king’s role was
reduced to mainly symbolic duties. The Diet convened in Stockholm every
three years or more frequently if necessary. The meetings attracted not
only the members of the four estates, but also their families and friends,
supplicants and others who were interested in politics. As Karin Sennefelt
has stressed, this temporary upsurge in the population of the capital led
to price increases on such commodities as lodgings, candles and ýrewood.
Almost all political activities took place in the relatively small city center
on the central island in Stockholm. This was where the estates held their
meetings in different buildings, where the Royal Palace was located, where
the central state bureaucracy was housed and where the Bank of Sweden
had its building and where the majority of taverns and wine shops could be
found. During the meetings of the estates the streets were crowded and the
city was buzzing with rumors about various political events and discussions.
Although the amount of printed material was very limited around 1750,
hand written squibs and libels as well as other texts were spread throughout
the capital in an attempt to inþuence opinions and decisions.10
Even though many took part in political life, key decisions were often
made by a limited number of individualswho regularly attended themeetings
of the Diet and who either held high positions in the state bureaucracy or
the Church of Sweden, or who were economically successful in the towns.
Consequently, politics was oligarchic in character since a number of leading
noblemen, bishops and merchants inþuenced important decisions. This
oligarchy was divided into different factions, commonly known as Hats
and Caps. In Swedish historiography, these factions have traditionally
been described as political parties, but they are better understood as social
networks since family and friendship ties played such an important role in
the political mobilization process.11
10. K. SENNEFELT, 2008a and K. SENNEFELT, 2008b.
11. The traditional view of these factions is summarized in M. ROBERTS, 1986. This
interpretation has been criticized in P.WINTON, 2006 and in K. SENNEFELT, 2010.
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The oligarchy’s main arena for wielding power was the Diet’s Secret
Committee, which consisted of 100 members from the nobility, clergy and
the burghers. The committee dealt with issues relating to foreign policy,
government ýnances and the military. Thus, the government’s budget was
decided by the committee, which meant that questions how resources
should be distributed and how deýcits should be handled was determined
by the members of the committee. As its name indicates, the idea was that
important and classiýed information should be discussed in the committee
and not spread to the public. In order to highlight this fact the members
had to swear a special oath of secrecy at the start of a meeting of the
Diet. Although it was impossible to prevent leakage of information to the
interested public in Stockholm, attempts were often made to ýnd out how
this happened.12
Beside the members themselves, information leakage was caused by
the committee ś reliance on the state bureaucracy both to supply necessary
facts before decisions were made and to implement decisions after the
meetings of the Diet. It was the responsibility of each central agency and
ofýce of the state to submit reports before a meeting of the Diet how their
area of responsibility had developed since the last meeting, and the civil
servants had to be ready to swiftly either reply to written requests for further
information from the committee, or in person supply the necessary data
during a session of the committee. Furthermore, after a decision was made
and the Diet had ýnally approved a measure, written information about the
decision was sent to the proper agency in order for it to be implemented.
These transfers of information created situations inwhichnumerous persons,
who were not members of the Diet, became involved in the political process.
For example, it was the responsibility of the Agency for Public Management
(Statskontoret) to oversee the government’s revenues and expenditures and
to manage the state’s books. The agency received regular reports from the
local tax collecting administration in all the counties of the realm. Thus, it
was the civil servants at this agency who could say if the government was
running a surplus or a deýcit, and what collateral could be offered if the
government needed to borrow. As a consequence, they were in frequent
contact with the Secret Committee and with its subcommittees dealing with
budgetary issues and the Bank of Sweden respectively.13
12. P.WINTON, 2010; P. KARONEN, 2011.
13. See for example, Bankodeputationens protokoll 1750/51, 24 October 1751,
vol. R4558, Swedish National Archives, Stockholm (hereafter abbreviated SNA);
Statskontorets memorialbok 1751, vol. 70, Statskontorets memorialböcker, Statskontorets
kammarkontor, Statskontoret, SNA. See also K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 72-76.
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Nevertheless, information about the government ýnances was
never spread to a broader public in the realm since data on revenues and
expenditures were never printed. The peasants for example, who did not have
seats on the Secret Committee, frequently complained about the fact that
they had to decide on taxes without detailed knowledge about the needs of
the state or how the revenue was spent.14 Thus, information about the budget
was kept within a relatively small circle of people in order to ensure that
what was seen as state secrets did not get in the hands of foreign powers or
individuals who were seen as not being politically competent. In this regard,
the difference between states with absolute monarchs such as Denmark and
France, and Sweden with its parliamentary system, was not great.
One of the institutions that played a crucial role in the ýscal affairs of
the state was the Bank of Sweden. The bank was controlled by the Secret
Committee, and the bank’s directors, who oversaw the daily operations
of the bank and who implemented the decisions of the Diet, consisted of
members from the noble, clerical and burgher estates. Below the directors
a staff of around 160 persons handled all the practical tasks. The bank’s
ýnances were in theory separated from the state’s coffers, but in practice
they were closely connected. The bank’s ýnances were structured around
deposits and lending to individuals and institutions, as well as issuing
paper notes in the realm. Also lending to the government and other public
institutions was important. Many members of the elite viewed the bank as
an important political tool in the promotion of internal cultivation of the
realm by providing credit and liquidity. Thus, it was thought that lending
from the bank could help develop agriculture and iron production, but also
assist in the establishment of textile manufacturing.15









Source. C. HALLENDORFF, 1919, p. 164, 220, 238.
14. A. CLARÉUS, 2003, p. 100-101.
15. C. HALLENDORFF, 1919.
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In Table 1, the development of the Bank of Sweden’s lending from 1745
to 1755 is highlighted. It shows that lending to the government dominated
at the beginning of the period, but that lending to private individuals
increased quite dramatically and in 1755 was larger than the loans to the
state. One part of the government loans originated mostly from the Great
Northern War (in 1745 these older loans amounted to 6,523,858 daler
silver coins), while another part had been established during the disastrous
Russo-Swedish War (1741-1743) (in 1745 these newer loans amounted to
5,566,153 daler silver coins).16 Consequently, as in other European states,
loans to the government were closely connected to the ýnancing of warfare,
while loans to private individuals were associated with mercantilist
policies, in particular the state’s attempts to improve domestic production
in order to reduce imports.
Table 2. Deposits in the Bank of Sweden from 1745 to 1755
in daler silver coins 1745 1750 1755
Deposits 3,899,457 5,136,000 9,584,000
Source. C. HALLENDORFF, 1919, p. 164, 220, 238.
In Table 2, the development of the Bank of Sweden’s deposits from
1745 to 1755 is shown. Clearly, the deposits were increasing faster over
time than the lending. Whereas the lending doubled from 1745 to 1755, the
deposits increased 145 per cent during the same period.
Table 3. Bank of Sweden’s issuance of bank notes, 1747-1756
in million daler silver
coins
1747 1750 1753 1756
Value of notes issued 8.4 10.8 13.2 16.8
Source. C. HALLENDORFF, 1919, p. 221, 232, 265.
The third part of the bank’s operations consisted of issuing paper
notes. The bank notes were originally transfer notes that were negotiable
and could pass from hand to hand in settlement of debts. From the 1720s
and onward these notes became accepted as equivalent to coin and
therefore gradually became the dominating currency and circulated widely
throughout the realm. The notes were at ýrst backed by specie reserves, but
this relationship between notes in circulation and reserves was abandoned
in 1745. This de facto introduction of a paper currency led to an increase in
16. C. HALLENDORFF, 1919, p. 164.
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the number of notes in circulation, which in turn increased liquidity in the
economy. As can be seen in Table 3, the value of the notes issued grew from
8.4 million daler silver coins in 1747 to 16.8 daler silver coins in 1756, which
amounted to a doubling of the notes in circulation.
The downside of such an expansion of liquidity was inþationary
pressures as well as a worsening of the value of the Swedish currency on the
international credit markets. The uncertain value of the currency threatened
to make imports of vital commodities such as salt more expensive. In order
to try and offset these negative effects, the Diet decided to establish an
Exchange Ofýce in 1747, which would purchase Swedish bills of exchange
on the international capital markets at predetermined exchange rates.
Foreign subsidy payments, especially from France, were to a large extent
used to pay for the bills of exchange. The development of the exchange rate
shows that the Exchange Ofýce was quite successful in its operations during
the late 1740s and early 1750s.17
The subsidies from France not only facilitated the operations of the
Exchange Ofýce, the subsequent bolstering of the Swedish currency and
the bank’s notes, they also strengthened the government’s revenues. In
order to highlight the sums involved during peacetime, ýgures concerning
government revenues are provided in Table 4. Although not all revenues
and resources of the state are provided, the numbers give some indication
of the sums.
Table 4. Revenues of the Swedish state 1750, 1752 and 1755
in daler silver coins 1750 1752 1755
Ordinary revenue 7,639,587 6,293,939 6,267,837
Extraordinary revenue 1,050,000 1,650,000 1,860,000
Foreign subsidies 2,123,457 698,068 670,000
Borrowing from the Bank of Sweden 0 2,525,000 166,667
Reservations 1,650,000 1,618,152 1,655,800
Total government revenue 12,463,044 12,810,159 10,753,492
Source. K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 230.
Table 4 shows that subsidies played an important role as a source
of revenue for the Swedish state in the 1750s. In 1750 for example the
17. L.MÜLLER, 2002; M. DENZEL, 2010, p. 344.
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subsidies contributed to around 17 per cent of total revenues. A large part
of the subsidies was used to start building the sea-fortress Sveaborg in
Finland and to establish a new þeet of lighter ships especially designed for
the archipelagoes in Finland and Sweden.18 Likewise, Table 4 shows that
borrowing from the Bank of Sweden helped to bolster available resources
when other sources of revenue were scarce. Thus, the payments from the
government in Versailles and the Bank of Sweden made it possible for the
government to have a higher level of expenditure than what would have been
possible if it was relying on domestic taxes alone. Or rather, more spending
using only internal resources would have created greater tensions within the
political system. Especially the peasants, who were the biggest contributors
to the ordinary and extraordinary revenues, would have demanded a greater
say in how resources were spent and could probably have blocked the
military plans in the eastern part of the realm through the power of the purse.
Consequently, the structure of revenues strengthened the power of the ruling
oligarchy. It was in their interest to create and maintain the interconnected
system of resources þowing between the French government, the Exchange
Ofýce, the Bank of Sweden and the Agency for Public Management, and
to keep it secret. No ofýcial information about the sums involved or the
intricate operations were published or in other forms presented to the
general public. In other words, there were no beneýts or incentives for the
elite to promote transparency in their ýnancial dealings. Instead, the culture
of diplomacy with its secretive deal-making and exchanges of gifts and
resources dominated.19
Although the different parts of the system were discussed in the
Secret Committee, the committee can hardly be seen as an instrument of
parliamentary control over the executive since the committee in practice
functioned both as legislator and executor in ýnancial matters. The
information about the ýnancial system that was spread to the general public
was mostly concentrated on the Bank of Sweden and its operations. Thus,
many ofýcial proclamations that were either read aloud in the churches
on Sundays or printed in the ofýcial newspaper focused on the terms for
borrowing from the bank and what should be done with people who tried to
forge the issued notes.20
18. On the new naval ÿeet, see O. NIKULA, 1933.
19. This culture is discussed in C. WOLFF, 2005, p. 115-222 and P. LINDSTRÖM &
S. NORRHEM, 2013. See also H. SCOTT, 2007.
20. See for example Kongl. Maj:ts ytterligare nådige kundgiörelse, angående en wisz
belöning för then, som kan bewisligen angifwa någon uphofsman til efterapade banco
transport-sedlar. Gifwen Stockholm i råd-cammaren then 20December 1754; Kongl. Maj:ts
nådige förordning, angående lån i Riksens Ständers Banque på omyndigas fasta egendom.
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2. Government bonds, openness and political change
The system of relying on foreign subsidies not only promoted secrecy,
but it also created risks in the sense that the provider of funds required
something in return for its support. This became apparent at times of
growing international tension, such as Prussia’s aggression against Saxony
in 1756, when France requested a Swedish intervention in the Seven
Years’ War by sending troops to Swedish Pomerania. It was very difýcult
politically for the government in Stockholm to outright decline the French
offer, especially after France promised to pay more subsidies. At the same
time, the Swedish government hoped that supporting the French military
efforts would yield signiýcant rewards at a future peace conference without
taking too high risks.21
The military campaign against Prussia lasted from 1757 to 1762 and
resulted in serious economic problems for the Swedish state. Around 44 per
cent of the total war cost was ýnanced by loans from the Bank of Sweden,
while French subsidies paid for around 20 per cent. The bank ýnanced the
loans to the government by printing more notes. Thus, the number of notes
in circulation increased from 16.8 million in 1756 to 44 million in 1763.
Such a sharp increase resulted in inþation and a drop in the value of the
Swedish currency on the international credit markets. The Exchange Ofýce
could not handle the situation and therefore ceased its operations in 1761.22
The economic consequences of the war led to popular discontent,
which in turn increased political interest. This political interest was fueled
by a growth of newspapers and pamphlets discussing political issues in
general, and public ýnance problems in particular. Many newspapers and
weeklies had started during the 1750s. Consequently, weeklies existed
in Gothenburg, Karlskrona, Norrköping and Stockholm by 1760.23 For
example in Norrköping, a weekly paper called Norrköpings Wekotidningar,
which had been established in 1758, used more than half of its space in
the latter parts of 1760 to critically discuss different causes behind the
worsening exchange rate. One of the main themes in the discussion was
to identify the secretive practices of a number of leading merchants as the
cause of the problems. Although it was not stated outright, the author was
Gifwen Stockholm i råd-cammaren then 29 April 1756. Regarding the government’s
proclamations, see E. REUTERSWÄRD, 2001.
21. P.WINTON, 2012a, p. 12-15.
22. P.WINTON, 2012a, p. 21-23.
23. I. OSCARSSON, 2000, p. 118-120.
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referring to the participants in the Exchange Ofýce and their self-interests.
In other words, the merchants who were responsible for transferring the
French subsidies into Sweden were accused of using their position and the
secrecy surrounding their operations to promote their own interest to the
detriment of all the realm’s inhabitants.24 In another weekly published paper
– Götheborgska Magasinet – a comparable argument was made about the
damaging effects of the exchange rate and the individuals whowere proýting
from the falling value of the currency on international credit markets.25
Similarly, the author Anders Nordencrantz printed a number of pamphlets
around the same time in which he criticized several leading merchants for
causing the fall in the value of the Swedish currency.26
Although no one explicitly criticized the war policies in print, the mere
fact that a key aspect of the ýscal system was scrutinized and critiqued in
pamphlets and newspapers changed the way actors viewed the situation and
their political practices. It was no longer possible to argue that key ýnancial
issues should be kept hidden from public view. Many observers as well as
members of the political elite started to argue that transparency and open
discussions were central components in a well-functioning political system
and as an important method to avoid corruption and other questionable
activities. Even the Secret Committee participated in the discussions
by printing a number of documents regarding the bank in 1766.27 Thus,
practices started to change before the implementation of the Freedom of the
Press Act.
Besides the more open and critical discussions about ýscal affairs
in the public sphere, the government’s own policies contributed to greater
openness. During the war, royal lotteries as well as long-term domestic
bonds were offered to the broader population. These offers were distributed
through state proclamations, which were printed in newspapers and read
aloud in every church of the realm. Thousands of individuals bought lottery
tickets and bonds, which meant that they obtained a direct ýnancial stake
in the government’s management of the economic situation.28 It signaled
24. Norrköpings Weko-Tidningar, no. 59, 22 November 1760.
25. Götheborgska Magasinet, no. 1, 5 January 1760, no. 9, 1 March 1760, no. 13,
29 March 1760.
26. A. NORDENCRANTZ, 1761a; A. NORDENCRANTZ, 1761b and A. NORDENCRANTZ, 1761c.
27. See for example Prästeståndets protokoll 1760/62, 14 November 1760, SNA;
Berättelse, angående hushållningen i banquen. Utgifwen på riksens högloÿ. ständers
befallning, af theras secrete utskott wid riksdagen år 1766.
28. Avräkningsbok för obligationer 1761-1778, vol. 2405 and Avräkningsbok över
Kongl. Lotteriet 1759-1768, vol. 2418, Statskontorets avräkningsböcker över inrikes lån,
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the idea that the general population should be more actively involved in the
ýnancing of the state by offering their savings. These new policies were
borne out of necessity: the French government was unable to provide further
subsidies to the Swedish state and there were no other major power that was
willing or able to step in and provide similar sums. It was also clear to a great
majority of the political elite that the number of bank notes in circulation
had to be curtailed in order to get inþation under control and to improve
the value of the Swedish currency. At previous meetings of the Diet, such
issues were decided by the members of the Secret Committee without the
participation of the four estates, but in 1761 the estates demanded to discuss
the bank’s lending. It was argued that since the bank affected so many
people it was wrong to maintain a policy of secrecy. The debate resulted in
a more open discussion about the operations of the bank and a halt in the
lending to individuals.29 Consequently, the established method of ýnancing
deýcits and major projects, as well as the internal cultivation of the realm,
had to be altered and replaced with other ýnancial measures that were more
transparent.
Two other key ideas that emerged in the political discussions during
the 1760s focused on the need to recreate economic stability by reducing
spending and to strengthen the currency by reestablishing a silver standard.
The latter goal required specie resources that only international creditors
could provide. Thus, attempts were made to establish Sweden as a reliable
debtor on international capital markets in Amsterdam, Antwerp and Genoa.
The negotiations were initiated by the Secret Committee, but the actual
discussions with the bankers in these locations were handled by Swedish
diplomats. For example the Swedish envoy in Vienna, Nils Bark, negotiated
with bankers in Genoa. The utilization of diplomats meant that the secrecy
that surrounded diplomatic practices was spread to the ýnancial area. In
particular, it was seen as important that the mere fact that negotiations were
going on and the sums discussed should be kept quiet in order to protect the
credit of the Swedish state and to prevent the spread of crucial information
to neighboring states.30
Kamrerarekontoret, Riksgäldsdirektionen, SNA; Kongl. maj:ts nådige kundgiörelse,
angående et kongligt lotteries inrättande. Gifwen Stockholm i råd-cammaren then 1 februarii
1758; Kongl. maj:ts nådige kundgiörelse, angående et inrikes tilgiörande lån af specie mynt
eller guld och silfwer. Gifwen Stockholm i råd-cammaren then 17. november 1762.
29. See for example Prästeståndets protokoll 1760/62, vol. R698, 7 December 1761,
SNA; Sekreta utskottets protokoll 1760/62, vol. R3144, 1 February 1762, SNA.
30. Sekreta utskottets protokoll 1760/62, vol. R3143, 27 January 1761; Sekreta utskottets
protokoll 1765/66, vol. R3274, 8, 29 August 1766; Letter from Nils Bark, 29 December 1766,
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However, borrowing in Amsterdam and Genoa also required openness
since it was necessary to convince hundreds of potential investors in Swedish
bonds, which were going to be offered on the market, that the pledges of the
Swedish state were reliable. In other words, the bankers only functioned as
intermediaries between the Swedish state and the individual investors. The
bankers could only interpret the sentiment of the market participants and
suggest terms that would work, but they could not guarantee the success of
a loan. These circumstances meant that it was important for the Swedish
state to manifest the government’s ability to make interest payments and
the stability of the Diet’s decisions. Furthermore, it became necessary
to counteract negative rumors that threatened the ýnancial process. For
example in 1766, during the negotiations with the Genoese, the Swedish
envoy reported that negative opinions about the Swedish state were being
spread in the city. It was alleged that Sweden already had large loans in
Amsterdam and Hamburg which could not be paid and that trading with
Sweden was uncertain because of the Diet’s tendency to frequently change
its policies. In order to neutralize these opinions, the envoy was instructed
to inform the Genoese about the Swedish realm’s commitment to pay its
debts as well as the latest decisions by the Diet in Stockholm. Thus, the
diplomat should try and inþuence public opinion in Genoa by providing
detailed information about the Swedish political system and the policies
of the Diet.31 The negotiations succeeded in December 1766 and a loan of
around 400 000 Hamburg banco was arranged. The loan was guaranteed by
the Agency for Public Management and the Bank of Sweden.32
It could be argued then that the Swedish government’s need for other
types of external resources than foreign subsidies created a situation in
which the Genoese could sway the behavior of the Swedish state. The
investors’ demand for predictability and reliability meant that it was
difýcult to uphold policies of secrecy. The behavior of the government was
continuously judged when the interest payments were due andwhen existing
loans matured. If the government reneged or concealed vital information
there was a risk that no further funding would be provided. At the same
vol. 2236, Genuesiska lånet 1762-1778, Räkenskaper och handlingar rörande upptagna lån,
Riksgäldsdirektionen, SNA.
31. See for example Rådsprotokoll i utrikesärenden 1766, 10 November 1766, SNA.
32. Letter from Nils Bark, 29 December 1766, vol. 2236, Genuesiska lånet 1762-1778,
Räkenskaper och handlingar rörande upptagna lån, Riksgäldsdirektionen, SNA.
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time it forced the government to clarify the resources it had at its disposal,
especially in relation to the administration of existing and future loans.33
How the ýscal situation developed after the Seven Years’ War and after
the new policies was introduced is described in Table 5.
Table 5. Revenues of the Swedish state 1765, 1767, 1769, 1771
in daler silver coins 1765 1767 1769 1771
Ordinary revenue 8,485,642 12,762,785 9,939,128 12,021,959
Extraordinary revenue 3,000,000 3,800,000 2,900,000 2,300,000
Foreign subsidies 0 623,791 0 0
Borrowing 2,279,093 100,800 2,700,743 311,445
Reservations 1,656,000 1,656,000 1,656,000 1,656,000
Total government revenue 15,420,735 19,919,942 17,658,096 16,638,881
Source. K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 230.
Table 5 shows that ordinary revenue grew but þuctuated more than
during the 1750s and that the extraordinary revenue was increased compared
with the situation before the war. The sharp increase in the extraordinary
taxation from 1.8 million in 1755 to 3 million in 1765 was a political reply
to the ýnancial pressures caused by the war. The increase had been one of
the main results of the meeting of the Diet in 1760-1762. It did not affect the
outcome of the war since the revenue only started to inþuence the budget
in 1763 and onward. Nevertheless, it was not possible politically to sustain
the higher taxes over time since the peasant estate was very critical of the
increase. As a consequence the tax was reduced.34 The table also highlights
the reduction in foreign subsidies. The summentioned in 1767 was a result of
an agreement between the Swedish and French governments regarding the
outstanding subsidies which had not been paid during the war. Thus, no new
subsidies were agreed. Furthermore, the table shows that the government
continued to rely on borrowing. Most of these resources came from the Bank
of Sweden, but also from the issuance of bonds on the domestic market and
through external loans. In 1765, 96 bonds were sold domestically valued at
around 170,000 daler silver coins.35 In 1767, the sum of 100,800 daler silver
33. A similar argument is made by Christiaan van Bochove concerning Danish loans
in the Dutch Republic, see C. VAN BOCHOVE, 2014.
34. K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 219.
35. Annotationsbok över obligationer 1763-1766, vol. 2407, Statskontorets
avräkningsböcker över inrikes lån, Kamrerarekontoret, Riksgäldsdirektionen, SNA.
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coins originated from the loan in Genoa and in 1769 the state relied on loans
in Genoa and Amsterdam (1,159,267 daler silver coins) The latter external
loans were primarily used by the Bank of Sweden to stabilize the currency
situation.36 In other words, the task that the Exchange Ofýce used to have
was taken over by the Bank of Sweden and a government ofýcial from the
Agency for Public Management. Consequently, developments showed that
the exchange rate continued to be a hot topic and that it was impossible for
the Diet to sustain the attempt to reduce its reliance on lending from the
bank, especially when spending was not cut in any meaningful way. How the
lending from the bank evolved from 1765 to 1771 is highlighted in Table 6.
Table 6. Bank of Sweden lending, 1765-1771




42,846,891 45,251,355 42,838,810 49,664,659
Source. Huvudböcker 1765, 1767, 1769, 1771, vol. 1677, 1679, 1681, 1683,
Räkenskaper, Huvudbokföringen, Sveriges riksbank, SNA.
The Diet’s decisions at the meetings in 1760-1762 and 1765-1766 to
reduce the number of bank notes in circulation led to a policy of deþation.
Thus, the inþationary pressures were reduced and the value of the Swedish
currency was strengthened on the international capital markets.37However,
many started to complain about a shortage of capital, especially in the
crucial iron industry, and high prices. When the Diet convened again in
1769, the economic issues were high on the agenda.38Many had discussed
the situation in printed pamphlets, weeklies and newspapers before the
meeting, but the discussions in the public sphere escalated into a frenzy of
opinions and suggestions during the meeting of the Diet. Again the Secret
Committee participated in the discussions by printing its thoughts about
the ýnancial situation. These suggestions were subsequently praised and
criticized by a number of individuals from different social backgrounds.
Many also saw the opportunity to use the debates to present their own
solutions to the existing problems.39
36. K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 215.
37. The exchange rate between the Swedish currency and Hamburg Banco fell from
236.81 on average in 1765 to 116.67 on average in 1768. See M. DENZEL, 2010, p. 344.
38. See for example the discussions in the Secret Committee in July and August 1769,
Sekreta utskottets protokoll 1769/70, vol. R3457, 7, 10 July, 14 August 1769.
39. See for example Riksens ständers secrete utskotts betänkande rörande þnance
werket, den 1 sept. 1769; C. DE FRIETZKY, 1769; C. CEDERSTRÖM, 1769; L. M. UGGLA, 1769;
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The public debate about the deþationary policies meant that it was
difýcult for the Secret Committee or any other government institution to
uphold a sense of secrecy concerning the ýnancial situation. The scrutiny by
a public which was reading printed ofýcial documents as well as newspapers
and pamphlets ýlled with critical opinions created a situation which affected
the political actors. On the one hand it increased predictability since they
knew that their actions were being judged by the public. This strengthened
the politicians’ commitment to the existing debts since it was difýcult for
them to initiate a process of default.40 On the other hand the situation made
it more difýcult to reach compromises within the political system. For
example it was problematic for a representative from a town or a county
to go against the opinion of his constituency by agreeing to tax increases.
Concurrently, the openness regarding the ýscal situation was strengthened
by the government’s decision in 1770 to borrow funds internally by issuing
bonds on the domestic credit market. The offer was distributed in the same
manner as before by an ofýcial proclamation and resulted in the sale of 283
bonds from May 1770 to April 1772.41
The Diet convened again in 1771 following the death of the king
Adolph Fredric. The economic situation continued to be high on the agenda
with several pamphlets and printed material from the Diet affecting public
opinion.42 The Secret Committee remained active in the discussions by
printing a report on the government’s domestic and external borrowing
activities as well as the attempts to stabilize the currency on international
credit markets. A report was also published concerning the proposed budget
for 1772 and the realm’s total debt.43 Clearly, there was greater concern
than before about the deýcit and the growing level of debt and how they
should be handled. The demands from the holders of Swedish bonds in
Amsterdam and Genoa to make regular interest payments increased this
awareness. Nevertheless, a realization that something had to be done did not
A. B. VIRGIN, 1769; C. G. LINROTH, 1769; J. F. KRYGER, 1769; J. VON ENGESTRÖM, 1769;
A. NORDENCRANTZ, 1769; P. LARSSON, 1770.
40. A similar argument is made by Anne Murphy concerning the government’s
commitment to pay its creditors, see A.MURPHY, 2013.
41. Handlingar rörande det inrikes lånet på 41 tunnor guld, vol. 2262, Akter rörande
särskilda lån, Riksgäldsdirektionen, SNA.
42. See for example C. E. HALLSTRÖM, 1771; F. H. VON LOHE-BURENSKÖLD, 1772;
J. ANDERSSON, 1772; E. BERGMAN, 1772.
43. Riksens ständers secrete-utskotts berättelse af den 24 julii 1772 angående
förwaltningen af wexel- och þnance-operationerne samt det in- och utrikes krono-
lånet sedan sista riksdag; 1772 års stats-förslag, provisionelt inrättad på ordinarie och
extraordinarie samt skuldfordrings-staterne med rikets totala skuld.
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mean that a consensus existed among the participants at the Diet concerning
the appropriate measures. It was difýcult to reach compromises in the
Secret Committee and between the four estates concerning tax increases
and reductions in spending. The commoners wanted a redistribution of
government resources and greater access to the top positions within the
state bureaucracy, while the nobility sought to protect its interests and
privileges. Moreover, the peasants did not want to agree to any tax increases
unless they received seats on the Secret Committee. These tensions between
the estates were also echoed in the discussions about the Bank of Sweden.
Some thought that it was paramount for the bank to issue further credit
in order to promote economic activity, while others argued that it was
necessary to restore a silver standard by reducing the number of bank notes
in circulation.44
Thus, the openness concerning ýscal issues had resulted in a situation
in which many policy options were discussed concurrently among the
participants at the meetings of the Diet and among the public. More people
than before were partaking in discussions and also in ýnancing the state
by providing loans. This participation led to a strengthening of the state’s
commitment to its creditors since no one dared to suggest a default to
solve the ýscal situation. However, these new practices did not solve the
underlying discrepancies between revenues and expenditures and they
did not create political stability. One reason behind this lack of economic
and political stability was the old ruling oligarchy’s loss of inþuence.
The oligarchy had used its position in the Secret Committee to negotiate
compromises between the nobility, the clergy and the burghers, and they
had used resources from foreign subsidies and loans from the Bank of
Sweden to ýnance the operations of the state. This system had guaranteed
the distribution of necessary resources to important groups at the same time
as the taxes could be kept relatively low. When the Seven Years’ War forced
the introduction of a new ýscal system, the oligarchy could no longer hold on
to power. The increased participation by commoners in particular resulted
in new ideas and calls for quite radical economic and political reforms, but
the climate of openness also resulted in more tensions between the estates.
Thus, transparency did not make decisions easier.
These tensions were exploited by the newly crowned king Gustav III,
who organized a coup d’état in August 1772. The coupwasmainly supported
by noble ofýcers, but there were also many who thought that a stronger king
could make some deýnite choices regarding the currency situation and the
44. K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 216-222; M. CAVALLIN, 2003; P. HALLBERG, 2003, p. 172-231.
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debt. The coup led to a strengthening of the powers of the king, especially in
relation to how government revenue should be spent, while the Diet retained
control over taxation and the operation of the Bank of Sweden.45
One of the new regime’s top prioritieswas to renegotiate the relationship
between the state and the Bank of Sweden. The interest payments reduced
the government’s maneuverability and it was especially problematic for a
king who wanted to strengthen his autonomy in relation to the old political
elite to have to contend with an institution that was controlled by the elite.
If the relationship was left unchanged it would mean that the king would be
forced to negotiate with the elite at regular meetings of the Diet concerning
the government’s debt. This can clearly be seen if we examine the debt
situation. At the beginning of 1775 the state’s total debt was calculated to
be 62.9 million daler silver coins. Of this sum, the government’s debt to the
bank amounted to 51.6 million daler silver coins, or around 82 per cent of
the total.46
The issue of the debt was also associated with another key area:
monetary stability. The new regime sought to reach stability by introducing
a new currency that was pegged to a ýxed silver value. As we have seen,
members of the Diet had discussed this issue several years before the coup,
but had notmanaged to implement a solution. At the end of themeeting of the
Diet in 1772 (after the coup) the king had been authorized by the Diet to deal
with the currency situation in a way that he saw ýt. This broad authorization
was used by the regime to push through a currency reform in 1776, which
entailed the introduction of a new currency (riksdaler) as well as a write off
of the government’s loans to the bank. In 1778, the remaining government
debt was transferred to a new debt directorate (Riksgäldsdirektion), which
handled all transactions regarding the debt. Thus, the debt was separated
from the other parts of the government’s revenues and expenditures.47
The decisions about the currency reform and the elimination of the
government’s debts to the bank were preceded by some discussions in
newspapers and pamphlets about the currency and what should be done
45. G. LANDBERG, 1932, p. 7-76; M. ALM, 2002, p. 177-185; H. TANDEFELT, 2008,
p. 52-113.
46. Diverse samlingar hörande till Crono-Lånen, vol. 2263, Akter rörande särskilda
lån, Riksgäldsdirektionen, SNA.
47. C. HALLENDORFF, 1920, p. 52-55; K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 234-236, 624-628; S. FRITZ,
1967, p. 20-22.
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to improve the ýnancial situation in the realm.48 These public discussions
diminished after 1774 when the Freedom of the Press Act was changed.
The change led to a reduction in the amount of pamphlets and other printed
material in circulation.49 The decisions were also antedated by a relatively
drawn out negotiation between the bank’s directors and the king. The king
suggested that the government would take over the responsibility for the
external debt that the bank was responsible for and that the bank would be
compensated for the revenue which had been signed over to the bank to pay
for the interest on the external loans. Furthermore, the bank would receive
part of the resources from new loans in Amsterdam in order to ýnance the
exchange of the old currency into a new currency with a ýxed silver value.
In exchange for these transfers of resources from the government, the
bank would write off all remaining government debt. The bank’s directors
supported the general idea of a new currency, but they were worried
that the bank’s assets would not be able to fully cover the exchange of
currencies. They were also concerned about the loss of the revenue that
was assigned to the bank. However, they were not able to prevent the start
of the exchange in 1777 since the king had the Diet’s authorization to deal
with the currency situation.50
At the meeting of the Diet in 1778-1779 the decision to introduce a
new currency was approved. There was also a brief discussion about the
elimination of the government’s debt to the bank. Although it was clear that
the bank would not be compensated for around 4.7 million riksdaler worth
of debt, there was no one who dared to outright dismiss the royal plan since
it would risk overturning the whole currency project. The elite’s passiveness
was also inþuenced by the fact that the royal plan meant that the estates
would not have to provide resources in the form of new taxes to handle the
government’s debt.51 Consequently, the de facto partial default succeeded
because of the king’s authority and because of the transfer of resources that
was made from the government to ensure that the bank would be able to
handle the introduction of the new currency.
The decisions taken after the king’s coup in 1772 led to a drastic cut
in the government’s debt to the bank from 7,564,153 riksdaler (the new
48. See for example Samtal i de dödas rike, emellan J. och N. om wäxel-coursen och
swänska þnancen, 1774; Tankar om þnancen, til min wän, 1774; C. M. BROMELL, 1775.
49. I. OSCARSSON, 2000, p. 154-155.
50. A.MONTGOMERY, 1920, p. 164-220; K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 235.
51. C. HALLENDORFF, 1920, p. 66-73.
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currency) in 1777 to 211,045 riksdaler in 1779.52 The bank’s ties with
the government were thus severed and it had to rely mainly on existing
deposits from and lending to private individuals and institutions. In 1782 the
bank’s assets were valued at around 9.5 million riksdaler, while the debts’
amounted to 7.4 million riksdaler.53 In other words, the bank survived the
default and the introduction of a new currency.
The default reduced the king’s reliance on the bank, and it freed
resources that had been allocated to the bank, but it also reduced the need
to have a continuous dialogue with the elite and to disclose crucial ýnancial
information. However, in order to manifest the bank’s independence from the
royal government, the king agreed that the bank’s ýnances should be audited
at regular intervals by a number of representatives from the Diet and that the
reports should be printed.54 This royal move did not threaten his autonomy
and it strengthened the bank’s credit. Instead of internal borrowing the king
primarily used loans in Amsterdam, Antwerp and Genoa to gain access
to crucial resources. These loans could be negotiated without the support
of the Diet since the king controlled the allocation of available resources.
Whereas external loans had been guaranteed by the Bank of Sweden and the
Agency for Public Management in the 1760s, after 1772 the loans were only
secured by bonds issued by the latter agency which continued to administer
the government’s revenues and expenditures.55 Consequently, the king could
utilize resources that had been freed after the settlement with the Bank of
Sweden, such as tolls, to guarantee the external loans. All of this increased
the king’s political autonomy. The structure of the government debt and how
it developed from 1778 to 1782 is summarized in Table 7.
Table 7. The structure of the Swedish government debt, 1778-1782
in riksdaler 1778 1780 1782
Internal borrowing 9,210,432 1,707,640 1,740,170
External borrowing 4,249,132 4,611,372 4,692,975
Total debt 13,459,564 6,319,012 6,433,145
Source. K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 626.
52. K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 626.
53. C. HALLENDORFF, 1920, p. 104.
54. T. LINDGREN, 1975.
55. K. ÅMARK, 1961, p. 270-271, 629.
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*
Developments of secrecy and transparency in relation to ýscal affairs
in Sweden from around 1750 to 1780 shows that the period can be divided
into three parts: one that stretches from 1750 to 1760 when the government
mostly relied on subsidies and loans from the Bank of Sweden to ýnance
deýcits and major projects. This system supported the ruling oligarchy and
the secrecy that surrounded its ýnancial operations. The systemwas changed
following the Seven Years’ War when the subsidies stopped arriving and the
falling value of the Swedish currency forced limitations on the issuance of
bank liquidity. Instead external borrowing in Amsterdam and Genoa and
internal borrowing through the use of lotteries and bonds expanded. This
change went hand in hand with increasing openness concerning ýscal affairs
and more critical public discussions about the use of resources and how the
problems of inþation, deþation and debt should be tackled. Participation in
political life was also broadened. However, no permanent resolutions to the
existing deýcits could be presented and passed at the meetings of the Diet.
This inability to ýnd compromises led to the royal coup in 1772, which
in turn resulted in a strengthening of royal power and a stop to the open
discussions about key ýscal affairs. Thus, the period ended with a return to
greater economic stability in relation to the currency situation, but it also
entailed a return to the secrecy of the 1740s and 1750s.
The Swedish case clearly shows that the transition from secrecy in ýscal
affairs to more transparency was not a linear process. Periods of openness
could be revoked and there was no guarantee that a king could not reassert
his authority and implement policies that strengthened secrecy. Furthermore,
the Swedish case also manifest that the existence of a parliamentary body,
which exerted inþuence over key monetary institutions, did not necessarily
mean that openness existed or that it prevented the strengthening of the
powers of the king. The argument put forward by scholars like Douglass
North and Barry Weingast and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
concerning the importance of parliaments in controlling the executive and
for the growth of more inclusive political institutions that are committed
to established rules is thus problematic from a Swedish perspective.56 It
seems that rather than the existence of parliamentary institutions per se,
it is far more crucial how the control of resources, such as tax revenues,
foreign subsidies and loans, is distributed within the political system.
If an elite or a king is able to control resources without negotiating with
broader groups, secrecy will prevail, but if the resource base needs to be
expanded by including greater numbers of people, for example as a result
56. D. C. NORTH & B. R.WEINGAST, 1989; D. ACEMOGLU & J. A. ROBINSON, 2012.
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of a crisis, openness will increase. Consequently, the reception of subsidy
payments from other governments increases the autonomy of the executive
since the government receives these through diplomatic negotiations rather
than through bargaining with the elite or parliament. The issuing of long-
term bonds on the domestic market on the other hand tends to lead to
more openness since they target a larger section of the population. When
it comes to external borrowing the evidence from the Swedish example
is not conclusive. On the one hand it forces the government to clarify
which resources are available and to act in a committed way towards the
investors. This process strengthens transparency. On the other hand, a king
can strengthen royal autonomy by negotiating loans abroad if he can offer
collateral that he controls without the interference of parliaments or elites.
The results from the analysis of the Swedish case also highlight the
importance of war as a catalyst for change. A similar argument has been
presented by Philip Hoffman and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, although they
have pointed to the Napoleonic Wars as a period of major political changes
in Europe.57 The ýscal problems that were caused by the Seven Years’ War
forced the ruling oligarchy to ýnd new ways of ýnancing the mounting
deýcits. Such a move required more openness regarding the ýnancial
situation, but it also led to the loss of political inþuence for the oligarchy.
New groups, which previously had limited political sway, could use the
growing public sphere to promote their interests and to argue for economic
and political change. Consequently, openness did not just exist during the
war, but it continued for several years after when the focus was on how
the monetary situation and the accumulated debts should be handled. The
Seven Years’ War affected basically all European states and it led to a wave
of economic and political rethinking. Thus, in for example Denmark, which
had a system of royal absolutism, reforms that included increasing freedom
to print, was introduced by Johann Friedrich Struensee in 1770.58 Likewise,
reforms were discussed and sometimes implemented in for example Britain,
Prussia and Spain following the war.59 The fact that these changes occurred
in both absolute states and in countries with so called free constitutions
indicate that the challenges were so great as to transcend these differences
in political systems. However, the changes in Denmark and Sweden did not
last. In both countries, the radical policies of the late 1760s and early 1770s
were revoked and it took until the nineteenth century before new waves of
economic and political challenges changed the policies of transparency.
57. P. T. HOFFMAN & J.-L. ROSENTHAL, 2000.
58. Struensee’s reforms are discussed in H. HORSTBØLL, 2011.
59. The effects of the Seven Years’ War are discussed in H. SCOTT, 2011.
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